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A dive into deep constitutional waters: 
Article 50, the prerogative and parliament* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The ambiguities surrounding the royal prerogative, including its definition, scope and the 
roles of both parliament and courts in checking its exercise, may aptly be described as one 
of the central problems of the UK constitution.1 This article is concerned with a particular 
aspect of this problem: the vexed question of the relationship of prerogative powers with 
statute in the particular context of EU law. This issue has suddenly assumed huge public 
prominence as a result of the shock victory for the ‘Leave’ campaign in the EU referendum 
on 23rd June this year, and the indication by the Government that it considers itself to have 
the existing right under the royal prerogative to ‘trigger’ the formal withdrawal process 
under the by-the now famous Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.2 Since it would be relying on 
the ‘foreign affairs’ prerogative, the Government sees no formal requirement for 
parliamentary authorisation of such notification, whether in the form of legislation or 
otherwise.3 This has led to not only intense debate amongst legal commentators, but also to 
an application for judicial review against David Davis, Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union,4 which contends that the Government lacks the lawful power to trigger the 
                                                          
*
 The author would like to thank Robert Craig, Colm O’Cinneide, Paul Craig, Carl Gardener, Alison Young, 
Robert Schuetze and the editor and the anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft and Jo Murkens 
for valuable discussions on relevant EU law points; any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author. All 
websites cited were last accessed on 12 September 2016.  
1
 For a well-known parliamentary critique, albeit one written before some recent reforms, see Public 
Administration Select Committee, ‘Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening Ministerial Accountability to 
Parliament’, 4th Report (2003–04), HC 422. See further the Conclusion of this article.  
2
 The Treaty came into force on 1 December 2009.  See below at 000-000 for an account of the different 
provisions of Article 50. 
3
  See the Written Answer given by FCO Minister Baroness Anelay:  ‘The European Communities Act 1972 does 
not require prior approval of actions by Act of Parliament. The European Union Act 2011 does define some 
circumstances where this is required, but these do not include a notification under article 50’: HL Deb, WA 
HL6447 (10 March, 2016).  
4
 Miller v Secretary of State for Brexit, case no CO3809/2016. The legal background to the litigation and its 
progress thus far is explained more fully in the article by Robert Craig in this issue: ‘Casting Aside Clanking 
Medieval Chains: Prerogative, Statute and Article 50 after the EU Referendum’ (2016) 00 MLR at 000 
(hereafter ‘Craig’).   
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Article 50 process in the absence of specific parliamentary authorisation granted through 
fresh legislation. The litigation – and discussion on the legal blogs5 - has raised some 
particularly tricky questions about the relationship between the prerogative, statute and EU 
law; the latter takes effect in UK law through the European Communities Act 1972, as 
amended by the European Union Amendment Act 2008 (hereafter, ‘the 2008 Act’), which 
gave recognition to the Lisbon Treaty, including Article 50, in UK law.6  Article 50 has of 
course never yet been invoked but is now of critical importance to the UK since, as the UK 
Government has acknowledged, it ‘is the only lawful way to withdraw from the EU’7, which 
the Government firmly intends to pursue.  
It is important to stress at the outset that no-one doubts but that the general power to 
negotiate, enter into and withdraw from treaties arises under the prerogative. As observed 
in Wheeler, ‘Ratification of a treaty is, as a matter of domestic law, an executive act within 
the prerogative power of the Crown’,8 a finding confirmed by numerous other decisions, 
including that of the House of Lords in Rayner (Mincing Lane).9 It has further been recently 
confirmed that that decisions to enter into treaties, together with the linked rights to 
negotiate and withdraw from them, are not in themselves subject to judicial review.’10 
However, the peculiar feature of the Article 50 question arises from the well-known fact 
that EU law is given domestic effect via the European Communities Act 1972, thus giving rise 
to a set of rights that are enforceable in domestic law. This has led to one of the key 
arguments in the Article 50 debate, based on a general principle of constitutional law stated 
with particular clarity by the House of Lords in Rayner: 
                                                          
5
 See in particular the series of articles published on the blog of the UK Constitutional Law Association in the 
weeks following the referendum result: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/blog/ 
6
 It did so by adding the Lisbon Treaty to the list of Treaties in s 1 ECA.  
7
The Process for Withdrawing from the European Union, (February 2016), Cm 9216, at [3.2].  
8
 R (on the application of Wheeler) v Office of the Prime Minister [2008] EWHC 1409 (Admin), at 
 [15]). 
9
 JH Rayner (Mincing Lane Ltd) v DTI [1990] 2 AC 418, 500.  
10
 The treaty-making prerogative was one of the areas identified in the seminal decision in GCHQ as being 
excluded from the ambit of judicial review (Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 
AC 374, HL(E)); the exclusion has been subsequently affirmed in subsequent decisions including JH Rayner 
(ibid); dicta in the Supreme Court as recently as 2015 confirm it: R (SG) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2015] UKSC 16, at [237]) (per Lord Kerr.  
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…the Royal Prerogative, whilst it embraces the making of treaties, does not extend 
to altering the law or conferring rights upon individuals or depriving individuals of 
rights which they enjoy in domestic law without the intervention of Parliament.11 
Put shortly, the UK government may not, through exercise of the prerogative, remove 
domestic law rights.  Since the European Communities Act gives domestic effect to the 
various rights guaranteed to citizens of the member states by EU law, triggering the Article 
50 process will, it is said, inevitably result in the loss of some or all of those rights, thus 
draining the ECA of content and frustrating its core purpose. Hence only parliament, 
through specific legislation, may authorise the triggering of Article 50.12  
The starting point of this paper is that this argument (referred to as the ‘frustration 
argument’) has considerable force and persuasive power and deserves the closest critical 
and judicial analysis. This article thus disclaims the notion that courts should simply find the 
claim non-justiciable, instead urging judges to take the plunge into the deep constitutional 
waters evoked by its title. In seeking to offer such analysis it will first offer a brief account of 
the content of Article 50. It will then move on to engage closely with the argument 
advanced in this issue by Robert Craig13 that Article 50 has been given domestic effect in UK 
law by the 2008 and 1972 Acts, so that it already has the status of ‘primary-equivalent 
legislation’, which directly overlaps with the relevant prerogative, thereby placing it in 
abeyance. Craig’s argument is worth spending some time on: it is important for a number of 
reasons to know whether we are dealing with a statutory power (as he claims) or one arising 
under the prerogative. While conceding the importance of acknowledging the statutory 
recognition thus given to Article 50, it will argue that Article 50 is neither made part of 
domestic law nor enforceable in domestic courts. It will contend therefore that the 
triggering power remains within the general prerogative power to conduct foreign affairs. It 
will then go onto argue that this case is very far from being a straightforward  application of 
the frustration principle and indeed that it contain a number of features that should give 
courts pause and which may render the principle inapplicable.  In doing so it will re-examine 
                                                          
11
 n 9 above, at 500.   
12
 For the valuable and extremely influential blogpost that first set out the argument properly, see N. Barber, T. 
Hickman and J. King, ‘Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable Role’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (27th 
Jun 2016) (available at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org).  
13
 n 4 above.  
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one of the key authorities relied on in support of the frustration argument – the Fire 
Brigades Union case.14 
 THE NATURE OF ARTICLE 50 AND ITS POSSIBLE STATUS IN DOMESTIC LAW 
Article 50: key provisions 
Article 50 consists of five paragraphs, making up a complex bundle of rules, procedures and 
limitations; it therefore needs careful unpacking to establish the different effects the various 
parts of it may have on the UK legal order.15 As is now well known, Paragraph (1) states: 
‘Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements.’ Article 50(2) provides that once such a decision has been 
made, the exiting state ‘shall notify the European Council of its intention.’ Despite the 
imperative language, the consensus appears to be that the UK (in this case) cannot be 
compelled to send a notification under Article 50(2),16 so that the EU institutions and 
Member States have no choice but to wait on the decision of the British Government’s in 
this regard. Paragraph 2 goes on to set out the internal EU procedures by which the Union, 
through its various institutions, ‘will negotiate and conclude an agreement’ with the exiting 
state. Thus the European Council will provide ‘guidelines’, and negotiations will then 
proceed, ‘in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.’17 Once reached, the agreement ‘shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament.’ Article 50(3) then importantly provides:  
The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into 
force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification 
                                                          
14
 R v Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513. There are 
numerous other issues raised by the Article 50 debate on which this article does not touch, including questions 
raised by the position of EU law in the devolution settlements and consultation with those of the UK’s overseas 
territories that will be affected by Brexit. The former is valuably discussed by S Douglas-Scott’s article on the 
same topic in this issue: ‘Brexit, Article 50 and the Contested British Constitution’ (2016) 00 MLR 000.  
15
 The entire provision is quoted verbatim in Robert Craig’s article in this issue: see 000-000.  
16
 See e.g. M. Elliott: https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/06/30/brexit-on-why-as-a-matter-of-law-
triggering-article-50-does-not-require-parliament-to-legislate/ 
17
 Article 218(3) provides that: ‘the Commission shall submit recommendations to the Council, which shall 
adopt a decision authorising the opening of negotiations and….nominating the Union negotiator’… 
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referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the 
Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. 
Article 50(4) excludes the exiting state from discussions in the Council concerning it18 and 
finally Article 50(5) states that a state that has withdrawn from the EU but wants to rejoin it, 
has to apply, de novo, under Article 49 TEU.19  
It is immediately apparent therefore, that, leaving aside paragraph (1) for a moment, Article 
50 deals almost entirely with the internal EU procedures to be followed and the respective 
roles of the various EU institutions in conducting and concluding the negotiations. In fact, it 
is an important argument of this article that the sole restriction or obligation that it places 
upon the exiting state is the two year period: this would render a state that sought to 
conduct an ‘immediate’ exit by simply denouncing the Treaties in breach of EU law – and 
thus also of international law, since a breach of treaty obligations is always also a breach of 
public international law.20 In particular, it appears that, while it is overwhelmingly in the 
interests of the exiting state to negotiate to try to secure a withdrawal deal, it is not placed 
under an obligation to do so.21 Thus an exiting state could in theory simply notify and then 
sit out the two year wait, making no attempt to negotiate, before leaving with no deal. We 
will return to the particular significance of this point below.  
                                                          
18
 It also defines ‘a qualified majority’ for the purposes of Article 50(3) by reference to Article 238(3)(b) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
19
 One key point is left unresolved: can a Member State that changes its mind about leaving (for example, 
following a change of government) revoke its notification and thus remain a member of the EU? On this, 
opinions seem to differ but there is a strong view that such revocation is indeed possible at least in some 
circumstances. Thus the process is probably reversible - at least in some circumstances. For full discussion, see 
PP Craig, ‘Brexit: a drama in six acts’, (2006) ELR, 447, 463-66.  
20
 Article 50(2) also requires formal notification, but this is something that would be required even for simply 
denouncing the treaties outside the terms of Article 50) 
21
 In support of this view Tatham points out Article 50(3) lays the obligation to negotiate and reach an 
agreement on the Union, not the departing state (A. Tatham, ‘“Don’t Mention Divorce at the Wedding, 
Darling!” EU Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon’ in A Biondi et al (eds) EU Law after Lisbon (Oxford: OUP, 
2012) 128. This is the view expressed by J Herbst, ‘Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European 
Union: Who are the “Masters of the Treaties” ’? (2005) 6 GLJ 1755, Hannes Hofmeister, ‘“Should I Stay or 
Should I Go?”—A Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw From the EU’ (2010) 16 ELJ 589; A Lazowski, 
‘Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to Membership’ (2012) 37 EL Rev 523, esp. at 527; 
Hillion also agrees that Article 50  ‘does not require a negotiated withdrawal’ (C. Hillion, ‘Accession and 
Withdrawal in the Law of the European Union’ in Arnull and Chalmers (eds) Oxford Handbook of European Law 
(Oxford: OUP, 2015) at 139..    
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Turning now to paragraph (1), on which most attention has focussed, we may note that it 
deals with two matters: it decides one as a matter of EU law, but leaves the other to be 
determined by the national constitutions of its various member states. The one it 
determines is critically important: it makes clear the right to withdrawal is now a unilateral 
one: it is not subject to the agreement of other member states and it may not be used by 
other states to force a recalcitrant state to withdraw.22 The second question raised by 
Article 50 is: which body within the exiting state may make the ‘decision’ to leave the EU 
and by what procedure? However this question is not resolved by Article 50. Indeed Article 
50, as part of the TEU, applying to all 28 states of the EU, could not determine the question 
of who can trigger it, since the answer to that question varies as between the different 
member states of the EU. Thus Article 50 excludes from its own terms the question of which 
state organ may bring it into play by coming to a decision to withdraw by providing that it is 
to be done ‘in accordance with [each state’s] own constitutional requirements’. 23 
In theory it could be argued that what counts, as far as actually activating the Article 
50 process, is not the ‘decision’ to withdraw, which in itself does not set anything in motion, 
but rather the decision to send the notification under Article 50(2). It could then be argued 
that, on a literal reading of Article 50, the ‘own constitutional requirements’ proviso only 
applies to the decision to withdraw, not the decision to send the notification (which is 
implied by, but not explicitly mentioned in, Article 50). It seems hard to avoid the conclusion 
that the UK has already decided to withdraw from the EU, now that the people have 
approved that course of action in a referendum and the new Government has formally 
announced, as it has repeatedly, including to Parliament,24 that the UK is leaving the EU.25 
                                                          
22
 There appears to be a consensus that Article 50 does not grant a wholly new right to withdraw, but rather 
provides a structure and procedures by which the existing right of withdrawal can be exercised.  For 
discussion, see A. Wyrozumska ‘Withdrawal from the Union’ in H J Blanke and S. Mangiameli (eds) The 
European Union after Lisbon (Springer, 2012); works cited in n 21 above; See also "The Process of Withdrawing 
from the European Union" (HL 138; 2015–16), at 10–13, where Sir David Edward and Derrick Wyatt reach a like 
conclusion.  
23
 The decision of the Court of Appeal in Shindler v Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster [2016] EWCA Civ 419 
confirmed this as the correct reading of Article 50(1) – EU law was held not to be relevant to its interpretation.  
24
 See e.g. the statement by David Davis to the House of Commons on 5 September 2016, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/exiting-the-european-union-ministerial-statement-5-september-
2016 
25
 The only way of avoiding this conclusion would be to argue that Parliament has not expressly authorised the 
sending of the notification. But (a) the argument of this article is that there is no legal requirement for 
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While of course a decision to withdraw is logically required before one can notify the EU of 
it, it is the decision to send the notification that is the critical one. Unless and until that is 
sent, the Article 50 process, and in particular the crucial two year time limit, is not activated. 
Conceivably therefore one could argue that the decision to notify is governed by EU law, not 
by a state’s own constitutional requirements. However, this would be a fanciful reading: the 
only sensible, purposive reading of Article 50 is that both the decision to withdraw, and the 
decision to notify are to be made in accordance with national constitutional requirements. 
The latter, since it concerns the question of when to make a formal communication with an 
international organisation under a Treaty, plainly also falls, at least prima facie, within the 
prerogative.      
Does Article 50 place the prerogative into abeyance? A summary of Craig’s argument 
At this point it becomes relevant to consider the elaborate analysis of Robert Craig in this 
issue. We need to know whether we are dealing with a statutory or prerogative power here. 
His argument in favour of the former may be summarised as follows: (a) Article 50 was given 
statutory recognition via the 2008 and 1972 Acts, such that (b) it is given effect in UK 
domestic law, thereby (c) directly overlapping with the existing prerogative power to exit 
the EU and thus (d) placing that prerogative into abeyance, so that (e) the power to leave 
the EU has become a statutory power, arising directly under Article 50 as applied in UK Law - 
although still exercisable by the Executive as the body that deals with foreign affairs under 
the separation of powers in the UK constitution. This is important to Craig’s argument, 
because, once the power to trigger Article 50 is seen as statutory, it sits on a par (indeed is 
part of) the statutory provisions of the ECA and he thus has an answer to the pro-
parliamentary position, summed up in the proposition that ‘statute beats prerogative’: since 
all relevant provisions are, on his account, statutory, they are thus on a constitutional par. 
This is an important argument that raises a genuinely open and novel question of law. The 
next two parts of the article argue that Craig’s analysis is ultimately unpersuasive and that 
Article 50 has no applicability to national law. However, in recognition of the genuinely open 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Parliament to authorise this and (b) as discussed in the text, the decision to withdraw and the decision to send 
the notification are plainly two separate decisions. The Government at least decided at the latest when 
Theresa May became the new Prime Minister that the UK was leaving the EU (under Article 50(1)). But, equally 
plainly, it has not yet decided to send the notification under paragraph 2 and all the indications are that it will 
not decide to send it this year.   
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nature of this question, the third part of this section offers an alternative argument in the 
event that Article 50 is found to be in principle so applicable. The conclusion is that the only 
possible scenario in which domestic courts might enforce Article 50 domestically is one in 
which the UK government was seeking to act outside it, by initiating an immediate ‘hard 
Brexit’. Needles to say that is a purely hypothetical scenario.   
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Does Article 50 apply in UK law via the 1972 and 2008 Acts?  
The argument that Article 50 is now a statutory power depends upon the notion that Treaty 
Articles like Article 50 can have effect in UK law. It is of course well known that provisions of 
the EU treaties can have effect in domestic law:26 the traditional test for determining this 
question is the notion of direct effect,27which nowadays simply requires that the Treaty 
provision be clear and precise enough to be justiciable in a national court.28 Another school 
of thought adheres to a stricter test for direct effect, but argues that even when it doesn’t 
apply, the primacy of EU law over national law still applies and arises wherever there is any 
conflict between an EU law norm and a provision of domestic law.29 However, regardless of 
which school is right, there is an obvious prior condition to be satisfied before any question 
arises of a provision in an EU Treaty having effects in domestic law: this is that it is capable 
of having effect in domestic law in the sense that its subject matter could alter the domestic 
legal position. While EU Regulations are designed specifically to be EU-wide legislation, 
applying directly and immediately so as to change the law in every member state, treaty 
articles do not necessarily have this legislative or domestic-norm-creating character. Many 
do, for example where they limit what a government may do in relation citizens of its own 
or another EU country (such as forbidding it from charging them customs duties on goods 
coming into the country)30 or change the rights or obligations that citizens (and private 
bodies) have in relation to each other (as in the well known requirement that employers 
ensure they give equal pay as between men and women).31  
However, there are Treaty provisions that clearly neither confer rights on individuals, 
nor or in any other way alter the content of domestic law: these are provisions that deal 
                                                          
26
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos[1963] ECR 1, 12.  
27
The concept can be applied to Directives, which take the form of a framework which member states should 
implement through detailed domestic rule-making, but which may also have direct effect: see Case 41/74 Van 
Duyn v Home Office (no 2) [1974] ECR 1337.  
28
 R. Schutze, European Constitutional Law, (Cambridge: University Press, 2012), 314. 
29
 Lenaearts and Corthaut, ‘Of birds and hedges: the role of primacy in invoking norms of EU law’, [2006] ELR 
287, 299-300 and 315; See also Betlem, ‘The doctrine of consistent interpretation – managing legal 
uncertainty’ (2003) 22(3) OJLS, 397-418. Craig places particular reliance on this notion, see 000-000.   
30
 TFEU Article 49, entitling any EU nationals to start a businesses in any EU state is another obvious example. 
This was the Treaty Article famously at issue in the Factortame litigation; for the best known decision in the 
saga, see R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603.  
31
 Van Gend en Loos, n 26 above.  
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exclusively with will be referred to as the ‘internal aspects’ of EU law, such as (for example) 
the functioning of the European Council32  or the ways in which Member States engage with 
the EU institutions (e.g. the rules governing voting in the Council of Ministers).  Since their 
subject matter is solely the internal workings of the EU, such provisions could not 
conceivably alter the content of domestic law. Thus, despite some early dicta of the Court of 
Appeal in the 1970s33that appeared to signal the contrary, we now understand that not 
every treaty article has effect in UK law via the 1972 Act: in each case, the question depends 
first on its subject matter.  
With this in mind, we may turn to consideration of the possible domestic 
applicability of Article 50. It is immediately clear that the vast majority of the provisions of 
Article 50 are solely concerned with ‘the internal aspect’ of EU law and thus have no 
relevance to domestic law. Obvious examples include the provision in Article 50(2) that the 
Council will decide on the withdrawal agreement by Qualified Majority, after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, or 50(4) excluding the exiting state from discussions in 
the Council concerning it.  Are there, though any provisions of Article 50 that do have 
possible application in domestic law via the 1972 Act?34 Craig argues that there are. Indeed 
his claim is that Article 50, as applied in domestic law via the 1972 and 2008 Acts, directly 
overlaps with the prerogative ‘in a number of ways’ and thus places it into abeyance. In 
order to consider this argument, we must remind ourselves of the terms of s 2(1) ECA, 
which provides that: 
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created 
or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to 
time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are 
without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall 
be recognised and available in law… 
The wording of s 2(1) is rather elliptical, but the key point is that it makes available in 
domestic law such of those rights, obligations remedies etc as are, under EU law, ‘to be 
                                                          
32
 TEU, Article 15.  
33
Application des Gaz SA v Falks Veritas Ltd, [1974] Ch. 381, esp. 393 and 399; Bumer v Bollinger [1974] Ch 401, 
418.  
34
 An obvious candidate could have been Article 50(1) concerning the decision to withdraw; but as we saw at 
the outset, that provision simply returns the question of how the decision is made to the state’s existing 
constitutional requirements and therefore cannot change domestic law: 000 above.   
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given legal effect or used in’ domestic law without the need for further enactment. That is, 
it makes ‘directly effective’ EU law available in UK law, in accordance with what EU law itself 
requires.   
Craig’s general argument is that ‘the prerogative of managing treaties, including exit, 
is constrained [by Article 50] in an EU context.35 Thus he contends that Article 50 ‘confers a 
right’, within the meaning of s 2(1) upon the UK (and hence the Executive) to trigger a lawful 
exit from the EU.36 He also suggests that Article 50 may be seen as providing a ‘procedure’ 
for exiting under s 2(1); and that it provides a ‘restriction’ on the previously untrammelled 
prerogative to leave the EU. Craig gives the example that, ‘under the prerogative, the Crown 
could exit the EU Treaties immediately. Under Article 50, via the ECA, the Crown must wait, 
perhaps, for two years’.37   
The most direct response to this analysis is to say that it simply conflates the effects that 
Article 50 has on the UK as a state in international law with the domestic law position. In 
other words, while Article 50 undoubtedly places legal constraints upon the UK’s freedom of 
action, all of these operate at the level of international law, not within domestic law. Article 
50 does what most treaty provisions do: it voluntarily limits some of the things the UK may 
do as a state on the international plane. In this case, it has agreed to follow a procedure laid 
down for leaving an international organisation, the EU, thus limiting whatever previous right 
the UK had, in international law, to leave the EU without a specified procedure. But unless 
every signing of a treaty involves surrendering part of the prerogative, this one does not do 
this either. Agreeing to Article 50 is not a surrender, but an exercise of the prerogative for 
what is no more and no less than its standard purpose – to modify the obligations binding 
upon the UK at the international plane.38 
It might be thought that the above misses an obvious point. Yes, other treaty 
obligations only affect the UK on the international law plane, but the whole point is that EU 
                                                          
35
 Craig, at 000.  
36
 ibid, at 000.  
37
 Ibid at 000.  
38
 See R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Rees-Mogg [1994] QB 552, at 570) in 
which Lloyd LJ said: ‘As [Counsel] succinctly put it, Title V [of the Maastricht Treaty] does not entail an 
abandonment or transfer of prerogative powers; but an exercise of those powers. We agree. So far as we 
know, nobody has ever suggested that the Charter of the United Nations, for example, or of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation, involves a transfer of prerogative powers’.  
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law is different – it is given domestic effect via the 1972 Act. To which the response is 
simple: the 2008 Act recognises Article 50 in domestic law but it can only have effect 
through the 1972 Act if it alters the content of domestic law. And Article 50 does not do so 
for the simple reason that it has nothing to do with domestic law.39 All Article 50 has done is 
to change how, under EU law (and therefore international) law, a state may leave the EU.  It 
cannot, therefore have any effect upon the existing prerogative, which is the general power 
that domestic law affords the Executive to conduct foreign affairs. But domestic law is not 
concerned with the numerous international law constraints, accepted by the UK through the 
numerous treaties it has signed, that rightly affect how that prerogative is exercised. Article 
50 is nothing more or less than another treaty-based, international law restraint: to assert 
its domestic effect via the 1972 Act is to chase a chimera.   
Craig relies specifically on the view of a leading EU law scholar that, ‘Today almost all 
Treaty prohibitions have direct effect – even the most general ones’40 and notes that, since 
Article 50 prohibits the UK from leaving the EU immediately, it may be said to have direct 
effect in UK law. Again, however the response is that the ‘prohibition’ in question must be a 
prohibition applying to things done in the domestic-law sphere, such as a prohibition on a 
government charging citizens less than the specified rates of VAT.41 However, it might be 
argued that that leaving the EU may have the eventual effect of extinguishing a number of 
rights that are currently available in domestic law and that the ‘prohibition’ on an 
immediate exit is designed to give protection to those rights; hence a possible field of 
application for Article 50 in domestic law could be established, opening the door for it take 
effect via the 1972 Act. However, the removal of such rights could occur whether or not the 
Article 50 process was used to withdraw. Using Article 50 does not prevent such rights from 
being extinguished, particularly given that Article 50 does not even require the departing 
state to attempt to negotiate a withdrawal agreement that might retain some of them.42 
Hence the better view is that the prohibition on immediate exit – the only part of Article 50 
that in fact imposes any restriction on a state’s freedom of action – is one that operates only 
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 With the exception of the decisions to withdraw and to notify, which, as argued above are both referred 
back to a state’s existing constitutional requirements; these therefore also do not alter the content of 
domestic law.  
40
 R. Schutze, European Constitutional Law, (Cambridge: University Press, 2012), 314. 
41
 Council Directive 2006/112/EC.  
42
 Above, n 21.  
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at the level of ‘international’ EU law. The point may be seen by comparing the various 
restrictions placed by successive implementing statutes on the ability of successive British 
governments to take specified actions in relation to the EU without specific parliamentary 
authorisation.43 On the one hand, the restrictions relate to things the UK might do at the 
international level. But on the other, the restrictions clearly sound in domestic law since 
they specify something that can only happen in domestic law: authorisation by the UK 
Parliament. In contrast the restrictions in Article 50 do not appear to overlap with the 
domestic law prerogative but only restrict what the UK may do as a matter of ‘internal EU 
law’; hence there is no question of the prerogative being ‘replaced’ by Article 50.  
Comparison with other cases of abeyance 
One of Craig’s further arguments is to say that those who see the prerogative as still 
governing the domestic law aspects of withdrawal are characterising the prerogative, or 
some ‘residue’ of it, as ‘sitting behind Article 50’. In attempting to show that such a view is 
mistaken, he offers a comparison with the Fixed-term Parliament Act 2011 (FTPA), arguing 
such a mistake would be similar to suggesting that there is a residual prerogative to dissolve 
Parliament still lurking behind the FTPA. It is submitted, however that the comparison with 
the FTPA shows the precise opposite. Recall that a statute may abolish – put into 
‘abeyance’44 – a prerogative by covering the same area with detailed provisions. It is clear 
from case-law that, in such a case, the prerogative legally disappears from the scene, and 
the matter is straightforwardly governed by the provisions of the statute.45 However, if on 
construction of the statute, it has not abolished or displaced the prerogative, but merely 
contains one or more provisions with which certain exercises of the subsisting prerogative 
could come into conflict, then the position is governed by the principle that has been clear 
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 See below at 000 and 000-000.  
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 I leave aside the debate as to whether, if a statute that impliedly abolished a prerogative power was itself 
repealed, the prerogative would ‘spring back to life’. Craig evidently thinks it would, which is why he refers to 
prerogatives going into ‘abeyance’ rather than being abolished. I would take a contrary view but it is not 
necessary to resolve this issue for current purposes save to note that Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the Fire 
Brigades Union case refers to prerogative powers remaining in existence ‘to the extent that Parliament has not 
expressly or by implication extinguished them’ (n 14 above, at 552, emphasis added) 
45
 The principle established by the well known decision in Attorney General v De Keyser’s Hotel [1920] AC 508, 
540 (HL).  
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since Laker Airways: 46 the prerogative may not be exercised so as to frustrate a provision in 
a statute.47 Thus it all depends on the construction of the statute.  
In the case of The Fixed-term Parliament Act 2011, it seems tolerably clear that it 
straightforwardly abolished the former prerogative of dissolution, whereby the Queen could 
dissolve Parliament at will (but, by convention, did so only at the request of the Prime 
Minister). This abolition stems very directly from section s3(2) of the Act, which comes after 
section 2 sets out the two different ‘triggers’ - ways in which Parliament can itself bring 
about its early dissolution.48 Section 3(2) then states simply, ‘Parliament cannot otherwise 
be dissolved.’ This must be taken to have abolished the dissolution prerogative by necessary 
implication, a finding confirmed by the Explanatory Notes to the Act, which say its overall 
effect is that, ‘The Queen does not retain any residual power to dissolve Parliament’;49 the 
specific Note on section 2(3) explains it as meaning that, ‘the Queen will not be able to 
dissolve Parliament in exercise of the prerogative.’50 Thus the only way of contending that 
the prerogative survives the FTPA would be to argue that section 2(3) doesn’t in express 
terms abolish the prerogative. However, this would take one to the constitutionally perilous 
doctrine of holding Parliament to be unable to abolish the prerogative unless it does so 
expressly. Since Parliament is able to repeal primary legislation impliedly, this would elevate 
the prerogative to a higher status than statute, which would be plainly contrary to the 
constitutional fundamental of parliamentary sovereignty by which, statute ranks higher than 
prerogative. Assuming that argument to be wrong therefore, consider the case of someone 
who wanted to argue that the FTPA did not abolish the dissolution prerogative, but rather 
that the prerogative still existed but simply couldn’t be exercised in a way that was contrary 
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 Laker Airways v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643. 
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 Craig’s article valuably explains the distinction between abeyance and frustration in more detail and re-
arranges the case law, including decisions such as ex parte Rees Mogg (n 38 above) so as to show how best 
they can be understood. His analysis in particular demonstrates how the Fire Brigades Union case would have 
been properly classified as an abeyance case had the statutory scheme for criminal injuries compensation 
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found to have frustrated the performance of the Secretary of State’s duty under the in-force commencement 
clause. This case is discuss further below at 000-000.  
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 These are the  first, a vote to dissolve Parliament by 60% of MPs; second, the passing of a motion of a no 
confidence in the Government, and the absence, within a period of 14 days, of a motion of confidence in a 
new Government (in both cases the FTPA sets out the required wording of the motions).    
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 Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, Explanatory Notes, at [6], available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/14/notes/division/6/3 
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 Ibid at [31].  
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to the 2011 Act. The argument would be an absurdity: given what the Act says, there are no 
circumstances in which the dissolution prerogative can be used at all.51 It must therefore be 
taken to no longer exist. 
 The comparison with Article 50 is striking. Not only is there no mention anywhere of 
any intention to abolish or restrict the prerogative, but it takes Craig many pages to put 
together his intricate, four-stage argument by which he reaches the conclusion that Article 
50 has, through a complex combination of EU constitutional doctrine, domestic 
constitutional law, the ECA 1972 and the 2008 Act, put the relevant prerogative into 
abeyance.  The contrast with the terse and straightforward statement in section 3(2) FTPA 
that disposes of the dissolution prerogative – ‘Parliament cannot otherwise be dissolved’ - 
could hardly be stronger. Furthermore, the case-law on abeyance shows that the courts 
require fairly clear evidence of a parliamentary intent to extinguish the prerogative. One 
view is that the courts have in some cases gone as far as requiring ‘express repeal’ of the 
prerogative – thus erroneously elevating prerogative powers above statutes, which are 
subject to implied repeal;52 this however rests upon a superficial reading of the case-law. It 
is true that in Northumbria Police Authority,53 which in part concerned the question of 
whether the prerogative of keeping the peace had been put into abeyance by the Police Act 
1964, Croom-Johnson LJ said that the relevant provision did not ‘expressly grant a 
monopoly’ of power in the area to the Police Authority - but then immediately went on to 
add ‘and there is every reason not to imply a Parliamentary intent to create one.’54 Thus his 
approach – and those of his brethren - remained one of simply construing the intention of 
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 Section 2(7), which applies following a decision by Parliament to dissolve itself using one of the two ‘triggers’ 
in ss (1) and (3), provides for the Queen to set the precise date of the next election on the advice of the PM; 
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 I. Loveland, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Oxford: OUP 5
th
 ed, 2009) at 102.  
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 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Northumbria Police Authority [1989] QB 26. 
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 Ibid, at 45. Almost the same phrase was used by ‘there is every cause not to imply a Parliamentary intent to 
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the statute overall – and finding insufficiently clear evidence of parliamentary intention to 
abridge or remove the prerogative.55  
A second notable case is ex parte Rees Mogg,56which as Craig notes, was concerned 
with a rather similar issue to the instant one – in that case a challenge to the ratification of 
part of the Maastricht Treaty.  Once again, the court did not find sufficiently clear evidence 
of intention to abridge the prerogative. Indeed, there were contrary indications, given that: 
When Parliament wishes to fetter the Crown's treaty-making power in relation to [EU] law, it 
does so in express terms, such as one finds in section 6 of the [European Parliamentary 
Elections Act 197, provided that certain treaties could not be ratified without express 
parliamentary approval]. Indeed, as was pointed out, if the Crown's treaty-making power 
were impliedly excluded by section 2(1) of the Act of 1972, section 6 of the Act of 1978 
would not have been necessary. There is in any event insufficient ground to hold that 
Parliament has by implication curtailed or fettered the Crown's prerogative to alter or add to 
the E.E.C. Treaty.57 
 
Thus the fact that Parliament, which in this area has placed several specific restrictions on 
the prerogative in statute, had not done so in this instance, was taken as evidence that no 
such restrictions were intended by implication.  
The overall lesson from these cases then is that the courts have required clear 
evidence of parliamentary intention to abrogate the prerogative in order to hold it 
extinguished or placed into abeyance. It is submitted that the ambiguous status of Article 50 
in domestic law comes nowhere near crossing this hurdle. Indeed it strains belief to suggest 
that parliament intended, by this indirect route, to replace the domestic prerogative power 
to exit the EU with Article 50.58  
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 The Court of Appeal judgment of course remains open to the criticism of construing the statute in a way that 
was extremely accommodating to the Home Secretary’s and his ability to use a little known and vaguely-
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 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Rees-Mogg [1994] QB 552. 
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 Ibid at 567 (my emphasis).  
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 The conclusion to this section is therefore that Article 50 is not applicable in 
domestic law under the terms of either the ECA 1972 or the 2008 Act. As a result it does not 
alter the substantive content of the domestic law prerogative or come into conflict with it.  
The power to trigger Article 50 therefore remains under the prerogative.  
 
An alternative argument: Article 50 imposes a single statutory constraint on the exercise 
of the prerogative  
Having proffered this conclusion, it must however be conceded that the status of Article 50 
in domestic law is a difficult and novel point of law and others – including the courts – might 
well find Craig’s argument persuasive. In particular, it could be argued that the prohibition 
on immediate exit in Article 50(3) is intended partly to protect the position of citizens of the 
departing and other member states from the adverse consequences of a sudden and 
disorderly exit and thus could be seen as being apt to take effect in domestic law and be 
enforced by domestic courts. Therefore the following argument is offered to deal with the 
alternative scenario in which a court is prepared to hold Article 50 applicable in domestic 
law.  
The starting point of this argument is the observation that, even if Article 50 is 
capable of applying domestically, it plainly represents nothing like the kind of detailed 
statutory code that was present in de Keyser’s Hotel59 and that we saw in the Fixed-term 
Parliaments Act 2011. While there are a number of detailed provisions in Article 50, the 
analysis above reveals that it contains only in fact a single rule that represents even a 
possible domestic law constraint on the prerogative: that is the requirement in Article 50(3) 
of a two year wait before a state can leave the EU.60 Even if this restriction may be seen as 
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 It was made up of the Defence Act 1842, as consolidated and extended by the Defence of the Realm 
(Consolidation) Act 1914, which together gave the government extensive powers of requisition, but 
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requirement on the exiting state to negotiate, or even seek to negotiate, a Withdrawal Agreement  
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biting on the prerogative as a domestic law power, it cannot sensibly be seen as ‘replacing’ 
the prerogative. Indeed there is no ‘prerogative to exit the EU’ (anymore than there is ‘a 
prerogative to denounce the European Convention on Human Rights’): rather both are 
simply particular uses to which the general prerogative of managing foreign affairs can be 
put. As such, there is no question of this prerogative being placed into abeyance by a single 
two-year time limit rule wait. It is of course possible that the prerogative could alternatively 
be used so as to flout or frustrate this rule. But this could only happen in one implausible 
hypothetical scenario in which the UK Government was (a) purporting to execute an 
immediate exit outside the terms of Article 50, but (b) without first procuring the repeal of 
the ECA.61 Not only is this is a purely hypothetical scenario, but we know that there is no 
chance of it materialising. The UK Government has quite properly said that it regards the 
Article 50 process as the only lawful and legitimate way of withdrawing from the EU and 
that it believes the formal negotiating process that only triggering Article 50 can activate to 
be vital to its declared intention of securing the best possible deal for the UK.62 Thus in the 
actual situation with which we are concerned – as opposed to an extreme and implausible  
hypothetical - the UK Government proposes doing nothing at all to flout or frustrate the two 
year rule in Article 50. On the contrary, its declared position is to act in full compliance with 
it.63 In conclusion then, even if Craig is right, and Article 50 could in principle be applicable in 
domestic law, not only does it not ‘replace’ the prerogative, but there is no prospect at all of 
the single applicable rule it contains being frustrated or flouted by government use of the 
prerogative. So the slightly paradoxical conclusion that is reached is that Article 50 would 
only have any possible application in domestic law if the British Government was seeking to 
withdraw from the EU act outside its terms.64 Since on the contrary, the Government has 
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 And other relevant legislation such as the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002. In theory such a ‘hard 
Brexit’ could be done either before triggering Article 50, or after doing so but before the two years were up.  
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 Even in such an extreme scenario, it may be doubted whether the courts would grant an injunction that 
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 See The Process for Withdrawing from the European Union, (February 2016), Cm 9216, at 7 and 13.  
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 In reliance on the doctrine of primacy of EU law (see text to nn 28and 29 above). Alison Young has suggested 
to me that one could view the sole possible effect Article 50 could have in UK law as being be to exclude 
legislative or executive decisions that were contrary to it.   
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publically committed itself to acting wholly within the procedure laid down by Article 50, 
that provision has no application on the facts in domestic law. It follows in turn that the 
prerogative power to trigger Article 50 remains unaffected at the domestic law level by 
Article 50. We may now therefore turn to the question of whether the use of the 
prerogative to trigger the Article 50 process would, as has been claimed, be unlawful.  
NON-JUSTICIABILITY OR WARINESS? 
“It behoves the courts to be ever sensitive to the paramount need to refrain from trespassing upon the 
province of Parliament or, so far as this can be avoided, even appearing to do so” (R v Her Majesty's Treasury, 
ex p Smedley [1985] QB 657, 666 Sir John Donaldson MR) 
 
Two reasons for courts to tread warily 
The Introduction to this article noted above that the prerogative of treaty-making per se is a 
non-justiciable area, as it concerns matters of high policy and the conduct of foreign 
relations.65 However, an exception to this must arise where it is argued, as in this case, that 
withdrawal from a Treaty would directly cut across, or even remove rights enjoyed in 
domestic law or would otherwise frustrate the purpose of a statute.66 Since just such an 
argument is seriously advanced in this case, it requires proper consideration: for courts to 
hold the whole issue non-justiciable would be the wrong approach and would fail to do 
important judicial work in clarifying the still murky world of the prerogative and its 
relationship with statute. Instead, the judges should take a deep breath and plunge into the 
deep constitutional waters invoked in the title of this paper. However, the question that 
next arises is: what should their attitude be? Should they be wary of intervening in this case 
- or confident that such intervention would be nothing more than the performance of their 
ordinary role? Should they therefore be prepared to rule against the government even if 
they find the arguments for so doing only marginally more persuasive than those against? 
Or should they resolve doubt in favour of non-intervention?  
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 In Wheeler, (n 8 above at [55] it was said: ‘That such a decision [to ratify a treaty] is not altogether outside 
the scope of judicial review is illustrated by the fact that s.12 of the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002 
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This paper suggests two key reasons why courts should tread warily. First, as we 
know, courts have been historically very reluctant to intervene in the realm of foreign 
relations.67While particular decisions have been criticised in this regard,68 it is suggested 
that courts are right to be cautious where an adverse ruling risks embarrassing the UK 
government, or in particular interfering with its ability to conduct foreign relations through 
fruitful negotiations with foreign governments or international organisations. A ruling that 
the Government is unable lawfully to trigger Article 50 without specific authorisation in 
fresh primary legislation risks doing both, especially given that such a ruling would hand 
Parliament, including the House of Lords, the power to delay the triggering of Article 50, 
perhaps very substantially, while also hampering the ability of the Government to choose 
the moment that in its view was the most propitious one to start the exit process. As one 
distinguished MEP has already commented: ‘The longer the new British prime minister 
delays invoking Article 50, the more will Europe’s political and constitutional crisis 
escalate.‘69 The UK Government is already under considerable pressure both from the EU 
institutions and the member states to ‘get on‘ with triggering Article 5070 and one can only 
imagine the exasperation and anger in Brussels and numerous other European capitals were 
the courts to hold that the Government had misconstrued its own constitution and was now 
obliged to introduce into Parliament a statute authorising the triggering of the exit process, 
given the strong likelihood that this would mean still further substantial delay.  Thus this 
aspect of the case seems to provide a good reason for a cautious approach by the courts.  
The second reason invokes the quotation from ex parte Smedley noted at the 
beginning of this section. The author of this paper believes that, as a matter of 
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constitutional principle, it is right that the Government, which must command the 
confidence of the Commons, should not take a step as momentous as triggering the Article 
50 exit process without in some way seeking the approval and consent of the Commons. 
However, this paper would contend that this is a general principle of constitutional morality, 
the operation of which should be worked out by the two democratic branches – Executive 
and Parliament – concerned. As the Lords Constitution Committee has put it, ‘Parliament 
and the Government should discuss and agree the role each will play in the withdrawal 
process as a whole’.71 The courts should therefore be slow to intervene in a matter that can 
properly be determined by discussion between the democratic branches unless certain that 
the law requires them to do so. In this regard it is worth noting that, should Parliament wish 
to exert control over when Art 50 is triggered, it has its own ways of doing so. These include 
calling for such a vote through reports of its Select Committees,72 scheduling a debate on 
the matter through the Back-Bench Business Committee or even passing a Resolution 
requiring that Art 50 not be triggered without its consent. As we saw with David Cameron’s 
shock defeat on the vote on military action against Syria in August 2013 and its aftermath,73 
a Prime Minister, faced with a clear vote in House of Commons opposing his proposed 
course of action, is most unlikely to press ahead with it, even when legally free to do so. 
And, ultimately, of course the Commons can bring down a government that threatens to 
defy its will with a motion of no confidence.  
In the well known Fire Brigades Union case, Lord Mustill noted in this regard that 
Parliament, is ‘jealous…of its prerogatives and [is] possessed of its own special means to 
scrutinise and control the actions of ministers’.74 That decision is well worth re-examining in 
relation to this issue, for two reasons. First, it similarly involved an intervention of the court 
between parliament and the government that was controversial enough to divide both the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords75 and to provoke serious academic criticism;76 
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second, reliance has been placed on the decision by those arguing in favour of judicial 
intervention.    
Lessons from the Fire Brigades Union decision.  
This decision concerned a situation in which Parliament had passed legislation designed to 
place criminal injuries compensation – then provided under a scheme established under the 
prerogative77 - on a statutory footing. However, as is not uncommon, the relevant 
provisions were not brought into force immediately or even at a fixed date thereafter. 
Instead the Act provided, per section 171, that the relevant provisions ‘shall come into force 
on such day as the Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument appoint’. 
However, the Government, after some years, decided that the statutory scheme would be 
too expensive. It therefore announced that the relevant provisions would not be brought 
into force and would instead be repealed; further, that it proposed to set up a less generous 
‘tariff’ scheme under the prerogative. The House of Lords found by 3:2 that in essence, the 
commencement clause gave the Home State a discretion as to when to bring in the 
legislation, but not whether to bring it in.78 Thus, while holding that the House would not 
compel him to bring the scheme in at any particular point in time, the majority ruled that he 
was nevertheless under a continuing duty to keep under consideration when the scheme 
should be introduced. By stating that he was never going to bring in the provisions and using 
the royal prerogative to set up a scheme that was radically inconsistent with them, 
therefore made it difficult if not impossible ever to bring them in, the Home Secretary had 
acted in violation of the duty laid on him by the in-force commencement clause.  
Thus on one view, the decision represented a bold intervention in a dispute between 
the two democratic branches of government – just as in our case concerning Article 50 – 
and shows how deeply controversial such an intervention can be. Lord Keith in dissent did 
not just disagree with the majority but said that he regarded its ‘interference’ as ‘a most 
improper intrusion into a field which lies peculiarly within the province of Parliament'.79 
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Lord Mustill regarded the majority decision as involving ‘a penetration into Parliament's 
exclusive field of legislative activity far greater than any that has been [previously] 
contemplated’80 and in particular saw the court’s intervention as both unnecessary and 
constitutionally impertinent – and this in an area of relatively low public visibility and 
political controversy! His Lordship indeed said, in dicta that could well be applied to the 
current case, that ‘If the attitude of the Secretary of State is out of tune with the proper 
respect due to parliamentary processes, this is a matter to which Parliament must attend.81 
One of the UK’s leading constitutional lawyers, Adam Tomkins has also criticised the 
decision as an unwarrantable interference by the courts between the democratic 
branches,82 echoing the criticisms of Lord Mustill. In particular, Tomkins argues that it was a 
‘serious oddity’ for the majority, even if they were right in construing the legislation as 
evincing a parliamentary intention that the Minister should bring the legislation into force at 
some point, not to ask ‘on what authority is it an expectation which is to be judicially 
enforced’.83 Where, in short were the precedents to justify what the House of Lords had 
done?  
My purpose in considering this case is not to join in criticism of the decision but 
rather to show how it was justified by a factor that is arguably not present in the Article 50 
case: namely the presence of a straightforward statutory duty on the Minister which was 
deduced by the courts doing nothing more than their ordinary job of construing an (in-force) 
provision in a statute – the commencement clause. For it is crucial in considering this case to 
recognise that, as Lord Browne-Wilkinson put it, the different aspects of the Home 
Secretary’s decision were ‘inextricably interlinked and the legality of the decision to 
introduce the new tariff scheme must depend’ on the lawfulness of the decision ‘not to 
exercise…the power or duty conferred on [the Home Secretary]’ by the commencement 
clause.84 Thus the entire judgment of the majority rested ultimately upon the construction 
they placed on this statutory provision. And, while one might disagree with them (and with 
Bingham LJ in the Court of Appeal) on this, it is impossible to say that the interpretation was 
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strained or implausible: it was based on the unexceptional notion that if Parliament goes to 
the trouble of passing legislation in each House through all the stages required, then it is 
reasonable to assume that it intends those provisions ‘to become part of the law of the 
land’.85 The contrary suggestion, made by the minority and by Tomkins, is that Parliament 
passes legislative provisions, but unless it brings them into force immediately (or on a fixed 
date in the future) it is thereby taken to have handed ‘a complete and unfettered 
discretion’86 to the Executive as to when and whether the legislation is ever commenced.  
In short, the majority did nothing more than (a) construe an ordinary provision in an 
Act of Parliament, (b) conclude whether it laid a legal duty on the Home Secretary and (c) 
decide whether by his actions he had breached that duty. All of these steps were, as Lord 
Lloyd pointed out, part of the courts’ ‘ordinary function’.87 In response to Tomkins, it may 
be said that no specific precedent was required: the proposition that a Minister must 
comply with a duty laid upon him by statute is an elementary aspect of the rule of law and 
does not require specific authority.  
This article spent some time on the FBU case, precisely in order to show that a 
decision that at first sight looks similar to this scenario is in fact very different, resting as it 
did on what was at bottom a fairly mundane exercise in ordinary statutory interpretation.  
The question that arises is whether in the current case the courts can find the kind of clear 
legal basis for an intervention that would otherwise undoubtedly cause far greater 
controversy than did the decision in the FBU case.  The following section suggests a number 
of reasons to be doubtful that they can.  Of course it could be argued that the courts’ 
intervention is required precisely because the Article 50 decision is so much more important 
than what was at stake in FBU and that their intervention would be democracy-promoting, 
in requiring parliamentary input into the decision.88 But in response it may be said that the 
sheer momentousness of what is at stake makes it all the more important that the courts 
only do intervene if they are fairly certain that the law requires them to; moreover, in the 
absence of such certainty courts are likely to be drawn to the argument that, precisely 
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because it is such an important decision, Parliament will surely itself insist upon being given 
a role in making it.    
  
26 
 
    
THE FRUSTRATION ARGUMENT AND THREE REJOINDERS 
The essence of the frustration argument is simple: that triggering Article 50 sets in train an 
irreversible sequence of events that will inevitably remove from UK citizens at least some 
enforceable legal rights granted to them under the 1972 Act and other legislation (e.g. the 
European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002). It would therefore violate the principle that the 
prerogative may not remove domestic law rights granted under statute. This is a formidable 
argument, with seemingly some authority.89 The alternative way of putting the argument is 
that triggering Article 50 will inevitably lead to the ‘frustration’ of the core purposes of the 
1972 ECA, which are said to be to ‘provide for the UK’s membership of the EU and for the 
EU Treaties to have effect in domestic law’ and indeed that starting the Article 50 process 
would ‘cut across the Act and render it nugatory….a dead letter.’ 90 
A number of objections to this argument have already been advanced by others, 
notably by two of the UK’s leading constitutional lawyers, Professors Paul Craig91 and Mark 
Elliott.92 These include in particular the argument that triggering Article 50 does not itself 
remove any rights granted under the ECA and that it is unknown at this point what rights if 
any will be removed (with the possibility still existing that none will be if the process is 
revoked). Paul Craig argues in particular that to hold that merely triggering a process leading 
to eventual withdrawal from a treaty would inevitably cut across the legislation 
implementing that treaty would be, not an application of De Keyser’s, but a ‘radical’ 
extension of it.93 A further argument advanced by Elliott in particular notes that the ECA 
gives effect to such rights as ‘are from time to time’ laid down by the Treaties: in other 
words, the ECA does not guarantee any particular set of rights, but simply acts as a conduit 
for whatever rights are agreed by or under those Treaties entered into under the exercise of 
the foreign affairs prerogative at any given moment. Hence action taken under the 
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prerogative that is likely to vary the rights protected under the ECA cannot be said to be 
contrary to its central purposes.  
This article does not seek to elaborate further on these arguments but instead to 
highlight the effect of the two arguments for judicial caution in this area explored above - 
interference between the democratic branches and the potential for harming the 
Government’s ability to conduct foreign relations. It is suggested that the two arguments 
together provide a basis for suggesting that courts should resolve legal uncertainty in favour 
of non-intervention. This would suggest that, if the rejoinders to the frustration argument 
considered above and below create at least some reasons to doubt its applicability to the 
peculiar circumstances of this case, then that may be enough for a presumption against 
interference in this area to kick in.  
The compatibility argument.  
The first argument directly contests the notion that triggering Article 50 would cut across 
the purposes of the ECA. It derives in part from one aspect of Craig’s argument that is both 
correct and crucial:  that the 2008 Act, in giving statutory recognition to Article 50 within 
section 1(1) of the 1972 Act, must be taken to have affected any sensible judicial 
construction of the purposes of the 1972 Act, which must now be taken to include orderly 
exit from the EU.94 Thus those purposes may now be seen as including keeping the UK in the 
ECA – and making EU rights available to UK citizens – ‘unless the UK decides to leave’.95 
Craig makes this point only briefly and his argument may be fleshed out substantially by 
reference to the EU Referendum Act 2015, which authorised the holding of the June 
referendum. If the question being asked is whether the Executive, through use of the 
prerogative to trigger the process of leaving the EU, is flouting the purpose of statute, it 
must surely be relevant to consider the parliamentary intention evinced by a statute whose 
very purpose was to enable the British people to decide to leave the EU if they wished to. 
While, as many people have pointed out, the 2015 Act did not make the result legally 
binding, it was nevertheless passed in the clear understanding that the result of a Leave 
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vote would be the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Therefore the 2015 Act must be taken to 
evince clear parliamentary contemplation of withdrawal from the EU under Article 50 in the 
event of such a vote.  
Importantly, this view has received judicial support from the Court of Appeal in 
Shindler,96 in which the court had to consider an (unsuccessful) EU-law challenge to the 
voting rules in the 2015 Act. Indeed Dyson MR went further in explicitly linking the 2015 Act 
to the Article 50 process for withdrawal. As noted above, the first stage in that process is 
that a state must ‘decide to withdraw in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements’. In this respect, Dyson MR made an important finding:  
by passing the 2015 Act, Parliament decided that one of the constitutional 
requirements that had to be satisfied as a condition of a withdrawal from the EU was 
a referendum.97 
His conclusion was that: ‘the referendum (if it supports a withdrawal) is an integral part of 
the process of deciding to withdraw from the EU.’ This striking finding suggests that, far 
from it being right to exclude consideration of the 2015 Act and referendum when assessing 
a decision to trigger Article 50, the judicial view is that that Parliament, in legislating for the 
referendum, actually intended it to be a constituent part of the ‘decision’ referred to in 
Article 50(1) to withdraw from the EU. In other words, Parliament not only passed 
legislation that expressly contemplated the UK leaving the EU: it provided for an event that, 
in the event of a Leave vote (which is what transpired), would become part of the Article 50 
process itself. Thus Parliament, far from evincing an unwavering determination to keep the 
UK in the EU - and EU law rights available in domestic law – has on this view actually 
legislated so as to enable the first part of the Article 50 process to be satisfied, in the event 
of the Leave vote that duly materialised.  In light of the above, it is suggested that the 
argument that use of the prerogative to trigger Article 50 would cut across the intention of 
Parliament as manifested in relevant legislation, seems hard to maintain.  
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 This line of argument may also provide a partial answer to one of the more specific 
and formidable arguments made by Barber et al. This is that even if the ECA guarantees no 
specific set of EU law rights (as Elliott argues), the European Parliamentary Elections Act 
2002 does: it provides for the right to stand and vote in elections to the European 
Parliament. Furthermore this argument is said to be invulnerable to the argument applied to 
the package of rights guaranteed generally by the ECA - that because some rights (such as 
those connected to the Single Market) may be retained, depending on the withdrawal 
agreement the UK negotiation, it is impossible to say that merely triggering Article 50 will 
inevitably result in their loss. Instead, it is said that, whatever deal is reached, the rights to 
stand and vote in European Parliament elections will certainly be stripped away. One 
possible rejoinder to this argument points out that even this outcome is not certain, given 
the possibility of unilateral or agreed revocation of the Article 50 notification.98 A perhaps 
stronger argument is that the 2002 Act could simply be re-interpreted, in light of the 2015 
Act, as providing for the rights in relation to the European Parliament, except in the case of 
the UK deciding to leave the EU under Article 50.  
A further argument still would point out that the notion that the Executive would be 
frustrating the purpose of these statutes, or stripping away the rights they vouchsafe, 
appears to be made on the assumption that Parliament will not, at the appropriate time, 
legislate so as to repeal or amend these statutes. Indeed the ‘frustration’ argument only 
really works if this assumption is made. For if the UK Government negotiates a withdrawal 
agreement that, when it comes into force, will involve the limitation or removal of some or 
even all of these rights (the latter being a perhaps unlikely outcome), and Parliament, 
before it comes into force, duly amends or repeals the relevant statutory provisions, then 
there would be no frustration of those provisions. But why should one make the assumption 
that Parliament will stubbornly seek to maintain in their current state statutes that no 
longer serve a useful purpose, or which now require amendment? Even if we grant that 
courts equally cannot assume that Parliament will repeal or amend them, then at most the 
courts are faced with the prospect that these statute may eventually be frustrated, 
depending on the currently unknown outcome of the negotiations and the future legislative 
action – or inaction – of Parliament. By contrast, cases like Laker Airways and FBU involved 
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government actions under the prerogative that, if not reversed, would certainly and 
immediately flout a statute and (in the case of Laker) wholly destroy the business of the 
applicant.99 So while of course it is the role of courts to interpret and apply the law and not 
play guessing games, the point is that it is precisely the uncertainty in this scenario that 
helps distinguishes this case, legally, from previous ones.  
The argument from parliamentary omission.   
A glance at the statute book reveals that, in the field of EU law, Parliament has long been 
astute to ensure that the Executive, acting unilaterally, does not alter domestic law as a 
result of reaching agreements with the other member states without specific parliamentary 
authorisation. Thus as far back as the late 1970s, section 6 of the European Parliamentary 
Elections Act 1978 provided that the Government could not ratify any treaty that increased 
the power of the European Parliament, unless that treaty had been ratified by Act of 
Parliament. This was reproduced in section 12 of the European Parliamentary Elections Act 
2002. Subsequently, the very 2008 Act that gave statutory recognition to the Lisbon Treaty, 
and thus Article 50, sets out in section 6 a long list100 of various specific EU-related actions 
that are not to be taken by Ministers without specific authorisation from Parliament: it does 
not include the triggering of Article 50 as one of them. The 2011 Act took this a stage further 
in setting out a number of matters, as before, that the UK Government could not do without 
parliamentary authorisation, but adding to it certain actions (essentially agreeing to 
extensions of the powers or competencies of the EU) that would additionally require the 
concurrence of the population in a referendum (the so-called ‘referendum lock’).101 Once 
again, none of these included triggering Article 50. Finally, we noted above, that the 2015 
Act not only evinced a specific contemplation by Parliament that the UK would leave the EU 
in the event of a ‘Leave’ vote but, as the Court of Appeal found, actually made the 
referendum part of the constitutionally required arrangements for deciding to leave under 
Article 50(1). However, once again, the Act laid down no further role for Parliament in 
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authorising a formal decision to leave the EU, or the notifying of that decision under Article 
50(2).  As Lloyd LJ observed in ex parte Rees Mogg: 102 ‘When Parliament wishes to fetter the 
Crown's treaty-making power in relation to [EU] law, it does so in express terms.’ As just 
seen above, that argument has only been strengthened by statutes passed after that 
judgment was delivered. Thus in the absence of any provision in any of the EU-related 
statutes passed from 2008 on, requiring specific parliamentary authorisation for the 
triggering of Article 50, it may appear inapt to construe one as being impliedly intended.  
The argument from democracy  
Such implication may be seen as particularly troubling in light of the referendum. 
Proponents of the frustration argument do not seem to consider the point that the 
referendum result itself makes any difference to its application to this particular set of facts: 
indeed supporters of the legal challenge to the Government tend to stress only (and 
repeatedly) that the referendum result was not made legally binding but only ‘advisory.’  
However, let us consider the normative core of the frustration argument as it applies 
generally. It is that the Executive should not be allowed to use the non-democratic 
prerogative, with its ‘clanking medieval chains’,103 in order to bypass or frustrate the will of 
the elected Parliament. Lord Browne Wilkinson in the FBU case set out very clearly this 
democratic basis for the rule: ‘The constitutional history of this country is the history of the 
prerogative powers of the Crown being made subject to the overriding powers of the 
democratically elected legislature as the sovereign body.’104 But to apply this to a situation 
in which the Executive is doing the very thing – starting the process of leaving the EU - that 
it was authorised by ‘the people’ to do by a referendum held on the issue, surely at the very 
least raises a question: should the frustration argument be applied where the Executive is 
using the prerogative to do no more and no less than carry out the will of a democratic 
majority, as expressed in a referendum?  To ask this question is not to fall into the error of 
holding the referendum result to be in some way binding on Parliament: its binding force 
lies entirely in the political, not in the legal sphere. However, that does not mean that the 
referendum result should be entirely ignored by a court considering the application of the 
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frustration principle to this novel set of facts: to do so would be to fail to heed the 
constitutional significance of that vote. Arguably what it does is supply, more directly and 
powerfully than any Act of Parliament, a democratic mandate to the Executive to start the 
formal process of withdrawal. As such it means, arguably, that the normative concern 
typically generated by the Executive’s use of prerogative powers to frustrate a statutory 
purpose is absent in this particular case. Along with the other arguments considered above, 
that may well be enough to persuade a court not to hold it applicable on this novel set of 
facts. Indeed I argued above that if such arguments even create a substantial measure of 
doubt as to whether the frustration principle truly applies in this case, that in itself may be 
sufficient reason for a court not to apply it.  
CONCLUSION 
The essence of constitutionalism may be said to be the subjecting of potentially arbitrary 
power to effective means of accountability and control through both law and the 
democratic institutions of the state. The introduction to this article described the 
prerogative as ‘one of the central problems of the UK constitution’, precisely because it has 
traditionally largely escaped such accountability and control.105 The last few decades have 
seen parliament and courts take a series of important steps towards addressing that 
problem, by bringing to bear new forms of control and much greater intensity of scrutiny – 
political and legal – upon governmental exercise of the prerogative powers. These have 
included not only the Fixed Term Parliament Act – a rare case of outright abolition of a 
prerogative - and the cases also considered in this article,106 but also the 2010 reforms of 
placing the civil service on a statutory footing and giving Parliament a formal, legal role in 
relation to the ratification of treaties.107 The new War Powers Convention, whereby 
                                                          
105
 Its still uncertain scope – and the related troubling issue of ‘third source’ powers are other aspects of the 
problem. For a fresh analysis of the latter see A. Perry, ‘The Crown's administrative powers’ (2015) 131(Oct) 
LQR 652.   
106
 Though see n 67 above: often the advances have been extremely cautious.  
107
 The last two achieved by respectively, Parts I and II of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, both 
of which have been criticised, especially the latter as overly cautious. The introduction of the Back Bench 
Business Committee as part of the Wright Committee Reforms has also been an extremely important step in 
giving the Commons some limited control over its own time, thus enhancing its general capacity to hold the 
government to account. The greater independence of the Select Committees – another product of the Wright 
reforms – is another important advance.   
33 
 
Parliament must approve proposed military action108 is another important step. Thus the 
prerogative problem is gradually being addressed, step by step, sometimes almost 
accidentally,109 and certainly quite unsystematically - just as one would expect in the UK 
constitution.  
It would in many ways be tempting to hold up this situation as presenting a golden 
opportunity for another such step110-- and indeed it is, just not in the way that the 
proponents of the ‘frustration argument’ argue for it. The argument of this article is that the 
opportunity for the courts is to abjure any temptations of non-justiciability, and give a clear 
ruling on the legal issues,111 thus shedding further light on some still-obscure aspects of the 
relationship between prerogative and statute; but that this is not the right case for the 
courts to require of the government that it seek parliamentary legislative permission in 
order to carry out its policy – in this case, triggering the Article 50 process. However, as 
made clear above, that does not mean that the author supports a high-handed 
governmental reliance on the prerogative that excludes parliament from the momentous 
decision the country now faces following the June referendum. Far from it. But if Parliament 
wants to insist upon being consulted before the Government ‘pulls the Article 50 trigger’ – 
or indeed wants to insist upon bringing that trigger under its own control, it has the means 
to do it112 and this author, for one, would applaud either step. It may be noted that a Select 
Committee has already said clearly that it would be ‘constitutionally inappropriate’ for the 
Government to trigger Article 50 without ‘explicit parliamentary approval’.113 This author 
thus rejects any notion that cases like FBU may present us with the ‘stark choice’ of 
embracing either parliamentary or judicial forms of controlling the Executive.114 On the 
contrary, the British constitution works most effectively when parliamentary and judicial 
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forms of control and accountability, rather than being framed as antagonistic alternatives, 
or mutually exclusive directions of travel, work together, but with clearly defined, 
differentiated and mutually complementary roles.115  
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